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Abstract
Nowadays, reliable and automatic subject authentication has become of the utmost
importance in multiple application scenarios. Over the last decades, biometric recognition
has shown to be a good alternative to password based systems. In spite of their numerous
advantages, biometric systems are vulnerable to presentation attacks (PAs), i.e., attempts
to log into the system with a fake biometric characteristic or presentation attack instru-
ment (PAI). These attacks pose a severe threat to the security of the authentication system:
any person could eventually fabricate or order a gummy finger to impersonate someone
else. Therefore, the development of accurate presentation attack detection (PAD) schemes
is key to the wider deployment of secure biometric systems. In this paper, we present
a novel approach for fingerprint PAD based on short wave infrared (SWIR) images and
multi-spectral convolutional neural networks (CNNs). In particular, four samples are ac-
quired at different SWIR wavelengths, which are subsequently fed to five different CNN
models. These networks first pre-process the multi-spectral information to obtain images
with three channels, and then apply regular CNN models. The approach is evaluated
on a database comprising over 4700 samples, stemming from 562 different subjects and
35 different PAI species. The results show the soundness of the proposed approach with
a detection equal error rate (D-EER) as low as 0.5%, outperforming the state-of-the-art
D-EER of 1.4%. In addition, fusing the SWIR information with laser speckle contrast
imaging (LSCI) sequences leads to an even lower D-EER of 0.2%.
1 Introduction
During the last decades, subject authentication has become a key task in a wide variety of
applications. In contrast to traditional methods based on PINs, passwords, or tokens, biomet-
rics makes use of the individuals’ biological (e.g., iris or fingerprint) or behavioural (e.g., voice
or signature) characteristics to recognise them [16]. This way, biometrics provides a stronger
link between the subject and the claimed identifier, and offers clear advantages over traditional
authentication methods (e.g., you cannot lose or forget your finger). As a consequence, biomet-
rics has emerged as the preferred authentication method for applications as diverse as crossing
borders, unlocking smartphones, or in national-wide identification scenarios [9].
However, biometric systems are not free of vulnerabilities. Different attack points were
listed in [25], including both inner modules of the system and communication channels. In
particular, the biometric capture device is probably the most exposed attack point, since, in
order to attack it, no further knowledge about the inner functioning of the system is required.
Such attacks directed to the capture device are known in the literature as presentation attacks
and defined within the ISO/IEC 30107 standard on biometric presentation attack detection [14]
as the “presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with
the operation of the biometric system”. In other words, an attacker can present the capture
device with a presentation attack instrument (PAI), such as a face mask, a gummy finger, or
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a fingerprint overlay, in order to impersonate someone else (i.e., active impostor) or to avoid
being recognised due to black-listing (i.e., identity concealer).
There is thus a clear need to prevent the aforementioned attacks. Presentation attack
detection (PAD) methods refer to any technique developed to automatically distinguish between
bona fide (i.e., real or live) presentations and access attempts carried out by means of PAIs
[21]. Given the security risks posed by these attacks, this new area of research has attracted
a considerable attention within the last decade, and different methods have been proposed for
several biometric characteristics, including iris [4], fingerprint [20, 29], or face [5]. Moreover,
several international projects, such as the European Tabula Rasa [32], BEAT [2], and RESPECT
[26], as well as the US Odin research program [22], deal with these security concerns. In addition,
the LivDet competition series on iris and fingerprint [6, 23] have been running since 2009.
For the particular case of fingerprint recognition systems, most PAD techniques are based on
the output of traditional optical and capacitive sensors [20, 29]. However, it has been recently
shown that images acquired within the short wave infrared (SWIR) spectrum can yield very
accurate PAD approaches for face and fingerprint [30, 33]. This is due to the fact that all
skin types according to the Fitzpatrick scale [3] present very similar remission curves for these
wavelengths, and at the same time quite different from other materials commonly utilised for
the fabrication of PAIs (e.g., silicone or paper) [30]. Therefore, the task of discriminating skin
(i.e., bona fide presentations) from other materials (i.e., PAs) becomes easier in this part of the
spectrum, in contrast to other wavelenghts for which the skin types are very different among
themselves and at the same time similar to, for instance, coloured silicone to name a challenging
PAI.
In contrast to the first SWIR fingerprint PAD approach proposed by Gomez-Barrero et al.
in [7], based on spectral signatures, Tolosana et al. carried out in [33] a thorough study on
the soundness of using deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in combination with SWIR
images. In particular, the sensor utilised in that work captures four grayscale images of the
finger at different SWIR wavelengths with a 64 × 64 px. resolution. Given that most pre-
trained CNN models expect RGB images (i.e., three channels), the authors defined a manual
pre-processing of the samples to convert the four grayscale images into three channels. These
RGB images were used as input to three different CNN models (i.e., VGG19 [28], MobileNet
[11], and ResNet [31]). On the experimental evaluation, tested on a large dataset including
35 PAI species, the accuracy achieved with handcrafted features for SWIR data [7] was widely
outperformed (i.e., the error rates were improved by 90%). In addition, the performance of the
SWIR based CNNs was further improved with a score level fusion with handcrafted features
extracted from laser contrast speckle images (LSCI) of the finger in [8]. In a parallel work,
Hussein et al. [13] developed a patch-wise based CNN inspired on AlexNet [19] for SWIR
and LSCI fingerprint samples, also with a score level fusion. Over a database comprising 778
samples and 17 PAI species, all samples were correctly classified for the fused system.
Building upon the work in [33], we propose an automatic pre-processing of the four grayscale
images via an additional convolutional layer, integrated with the CNN model and trained
together. This way, the four grayscale images can be regarded as a single four-channel image,
and the network can learn the most discriminant features for the subsequent layers to process,
thereby enhancing the overall detection performance. In addition to the three networks analysed
in that previous work (i.e., a ResNet trained from scratch, and the pre-trained MobileNet and
VGG19 models), we have studied i) the newer MobileNetV2 model [27], which includes residual
connections in the form of inverted bottlenecks, and ii) the VGGFace network [24], pre-trained
on facial images for recognition purposes. Since VGGFace has been trained on more skin
data, this could be beneficial for the PAD task. Then, all PAD partial scores (i.e., one per
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Figure 1: General diagram of the proposed PAD method. First, images in four different SWIR
wavelengths are acquired from the finger. These are later used to train five different CNN models
(a 5-layer ResNet, reduced versions of MobileNet and MobileNetV2, VGG19, and VGGFace,
see Fig. 3 for details), where an initial pre-processing module (see Fig. 2) is included to convert
the four wavelenghts into 3-channel images. Finally, a score level fusion is carried out.
CNN model) are combined with a weighted sum rule, as depicted in Fig. 1, to achieve a more
robust PAD scheme. The performance of the proposed PAD approach is evaluated on the same
database as [33, 8], which comprises more than 4700 samples and 35 different PAI species, and
following the same protocol proposed to enable a fair benchmark with those previous works.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Sect. 2 describes the proposed PAD approach.
The experimental protocol is then presented in Sect. 3, and the results analysed in Sect. 4.
Final conclusions are then drawn in Sect. 5.
2 Presentation Attack Detection Method
The proposed methodology is summarised in Fig. 1. First, a dedicated capture device (Sect. 2.1)
acquires images of the finger at four different wavelengths within the SWIR spectrum. Then,
those images are fed to five different CNN models, including an additional pre-processing layer
at the beginning (Sect. 2.2.1). The models are described in detail in Sect. 2.2 and Fig. 3.
Finally, the output of different models can be fused at score level, as presented in Sect. 2.3, in
order to achieve a more robust PAD module.
2.1 Multi-Spectral Short Wave Infrared (SWIR) Sensor
The finger SWIR capture device used in the present work was developed within the BATL
project [1] in cooperation with our project partners. In essence, the sensor is a closed box
with a slot on the top for the finger (see Fig. 1, left), with the camera and lens placed inside
the box. When the finger is placed over the slot, all ambient light is blocked and therefore
only the desired wavelength is considered during the acquisition. In particular, a Hamamatsu
G11097-0606S InGaAs area image sensor has been used, which captures 64 × 64 px. images,
3
Multi-Spectral CNNs for Biometric Presentation Attack Detection M. Gomez-Barrero and C. Busch
with a 25 mm fixed focal length lens optimised for wavelengths within 900 – 1700 nm. Following
the findings of [30] for facial PAD, four wavelengths are captured, namely: 1200 nm, 1300 nm,
1450 nm, and 1550 nm. It is in these wavelengths that all skin types present similar remission
curves (i.e., the bona fide intra-class variability is reduced), thereby facilitating the PAD task
of discriminating skin vs. non-skin materials (i.e., presentation attacks).
It should also be noted that the camera captures the finger slot and the surrounding area
of the box. Since the finger is always placed over the fixed open slot, and the camera does not
move, the region of interest (ROI) can be extracted using a simple fixed size cropping. Thus,
the final ROI has a size of 18× 58 px. The four ROIs for a bona fide, from now on referred to
simply as images or samples, are depicted in Fig. 1.
Furthermore, fingerprint verification can be carried out with contactless finger photos ac-
quired in the visible spectrum with an additional 1.3 MP camera and a 35 mm VIS-NIR lens,
which are placed next to the SWIR sensor within the closed box. As it has been shown in [18],
commercial off-the-shelf systems can extract minutiae correctly from these samples, in order to
allow compatibility with conventional fingerprint sensors.
2.2 Multi-Spectral Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
A convolutional neural network (CNN) is a class of deep neural networks, most commonly
applied to image analysis. The name convolutional refers to the mathematical operation called
convolution, which is a particular type of linear operation and is the core of this type of networks.
In general, a convolution is defined as the integral of the product of two functions after one is
reversed and shifted. This way, the convolutional operation produces a third function expressing
how the shape of one is modified by the other. In the specific case of CNNs, a convolutional
layer consists of a set of learnable filters (or kernels). To train their corresponding parameters,
each filter is convolved across the width and height of the input volume (e.g., three for an input
RGB image), computing the dot product between the entries of the filter and the input. This
process results in a 2-dimensional activation map of that filter. This way, the network learns
filters that activate when some specific type of feature at some spatial position is detected in
the input (e.g., a simple vertical line, or something more complex such as the shape of the ear
of a cat). Stacking the activation maps for all filters along the depth dimension forms the full
output of the convolution layer.
In general, CNNs consist of an input and an output layer, as well as multiple hidden layers,
whose inputs and outputs are masked by the activation function. These hidden layers typically
consist of a series of the aforementioned convolutional layers. The activation function removes
negative values from an activation map by setting them to zero, thereby increasing the nonlinear
properties of the decision function and of the overall network without affecting the receptive
fields of the convolution layer. In addition, pooling and normalisation layers also increase the
convergence speed during training.
2.2.1 Input Pre-Processing
As mentioned above, most CNN models have been trained on, and thus expect, RGB images.
However, the SWIR sensor described in Sect. 2.1 outputs four different grayscale images acquired
at different wavelengths. Therefore, the PAD method proposed in [33] included a manual
preprocessing of the four SWIR samples to convert them to an RGB image, as depicted in
Fig. 2 (right).
In contrast to that manual preprocessing, which may not be optimised for the CNN model
at hand, we propose to let the network itself convert the four grayscale input channels intro
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InputProc (P)
PxP Conv, 3
Batch Normalisation
ReLu
Handcrafted conversion to RGB
Figure 2: Left: The four SWIR images are automatically processed by the corresponding CNN
model using a pre-processing convolutional layer with three filters of size P ×P and a stride of
1. In addition, batch normalisation and a ReLu activation are used to facilitate convergence.
The result is a 3-channel image. Right: the handcrafted conversion proposed in [33].
images (i.e., tensors) comprising three channels. This way, the network can apply different
linear combinations to each region of the image and learn the most suitable features for the
following layers. To that end, we include at the beginning of each CNN model the pre-processing
module showed in Fig. 2 (left), as depicted in Fig. 3 in purple. This new convolutional layer
has a four-dimensional tensor as input, a stride of one in order to preserve the image size, and
a filter of size P × P px. The value of P needs to be optimised ad hoc for each model. In
addition, to facilitate convergence during training, batch normalisation and a ReLu activation
function are added to the convolutional layer. The corresponding parameters will be trained
together with the last layers of the pre-trained models, or the full network trained from scratch.
It should be noted that, as it will be shown in Sect. 4.1, each network will learn in this first
layer different image representations, even though the same layer structure is used in all networks
for pre-processing the four-dimensional input. This highlights the relevance of adequately pre-
processing the data for the CNN model at hand, instead of using a fixed pre-processing method
as in [33].
2.2.2 CNN Models
We consider five different CNN models, whose architectures are shown in Fig. 3. First, we study
the three models analysed in [33], namely: i) a residual network trained from scratch, ii) a model
based on the pre-trained MobileNet [12], and iii) a model based on the pre-trained VGG19 [28].
In addition, we also study two further CNN architectures: iv) a model based on the pre-trained
MobileNetV2 [27], which is an improved version of MobileNet, and v) a model based on the
pre-trained VGGFace (VGG16) [24], which has been trained on facial images, thus containing
skin, instead of training it on the more general ImageNet database as the remaining pre-trained
models. All strategies have been implemented under the Keras framework using Tensorflow
as back-end, with a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 GPU. Adam optimizer is considered with a
learning rate value of 0.0001 and a loss function based on binary cross-entropy.
As already pointed out, the first approach is focused on training a residual CNN [10]
5
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Figure 3: Proposed network architectures. From left to right: i) the residual CNN trained from
scratch using only the SWIR fingerprint database (319,937 parameters); ii) the pre-trained
MobileNet-based model (815,809 parameters); iii) the pre-trained MobileNetV2-based model
(437,985 parameters, see Fig. 4 for details on the bottlenecks); iv) the pre-trained VGG19-
based model (20,155,969 parameters); and v) the pre-trained VGGFace-based model (20,155,969
parameters). All pre-trained models are adapted using transfer learning techniques over the
last white-background layers. Also, the first convolutional layer (purple) (i.e., “pre-processing
layer”, see Fig. 2) is trained for all networks.
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MobileNetV2 Bottleneck (t, c, s)
Input
1x1 Conv, t x input_channels
3x3 Depthwise Conv
1x1 Conv, c, /s
Output
Figure 4: 3-layer structure of the bottleneck residual block of MobileNetV2, where t denotes
the expansion factor, and c and s the number of filters and stride of the last convolutional layer.
after each convolution and before the ReLu activation.
The remaining CNN models considered are based on pre-trained models and transfer learn-
ing. In all cases, the fully-connected layers designed for the ImageNet [19] or facial classification
tasks have been removed.
Both MobileNet [12] and MobileNetV2 [27] are based on depthwise separable convolu-
tions. These layers perform a spatial convolution on each channel of their input, independently,
before mixing output channels via a pointwise (i.e., 1×1) convolution. This is conceptually
equivalent to separating the learning of spatial features and the learning of channel-wise fea-
tures. This is justified by the correlations within neighbouring pixels in the images, but the
relative independence of a given pixel across channels, which is specially the case for the infor-
mation captured at each SWIR wavelength. In addition, this type of convolutions require fewer
parameters and computations, thereby allowing a speedy training using less data.
In both MobileNet networks, downsampling is directly applied by the convolutional layers
that have a stride of 2 (represented by /2 in the convolutional layers of Fig. 3). This network
architecture allows to reduce both model size and training/testing times, thus being a good
solution for mobile and embedded vision applications. With respect to MobileNet, the main
contribution of MobileNetV2 [27] is the use of residual connections and inverted bottlenecks (see
Figs. 3 and 4). The rationale to implement such bottlenecks stems from the assumption of the
low dimensionality of the manifold of interest on which the discriminative information extracted
by the internal layers of the network lies. Therefore, linear bottleneck layers are introduced in
the model and the residual connections are established between the aforementioned bottlenecks
(i.e., in contrast to more common approaches where the residuals connect layers with a higher
number of filters or output channels).
Finally, given the depth of both MobileNet models and the limited amount of data available,
out of the 13 blocks of MobileNet, we retain only eight of the blocks, adapting the last one
during training. Similarly, out of the 16 bottlenecks of MobileNetV2, 12 are used and the last
two re-trained.
On the other hand, two different VGG based models have been studied, VGG19 [28] and
VGGFace1 [24]. These networks are older and more simple than the MobileNets; however, due
to its simplicity, VGG19 is still one of the most popular network architectures, providing very
good results in a wide range of competitions. In fact, VGG19 showed a superior performance
with respect to MobileNet for fingerprint PAD in [33].
Whereas VGG19 comprises 19 different layers, VGGFace is based on the smaller VGG16
1Implementation available at https://github.com/rcmalli/keras-vggface
7
Multi-Spectral CNNs for Biometric Presentation Attack Detection M. Gomez-Barrero and C. Busch
model, including 16 layers. In addition, the later has been trained on facial databases acquired
in the wild (i.e., modelling realistic scenarios in opposition to controlled environments with
frontal poses and fixed illumination). Therefore, VGG19 has been pre-trained on a multi-class
task in contrast to the two class problem of face recognition for VGGFace. For our study, the
last fully-connected layers have been replaced with 2 fully-connected layers with a final sigmoid
activation function. In addition, the last three convolutional layers, depicted in white in Fig. 3,
are re-trained in both models.
2.3 Fusion
As it was already observed in [33], different CNN models are more robust to specific PAI
species than others. Therefore, the fusion of the final PAD scores output by several models
yields a higher detection performance. In our case (see Sect. 4 for more details), we found
that the optimal results are achieved fusing three different models: ResNet, MobileNetV2, and
VGGFace. Therefore, we define the final PAD score as follows:
s = α · svggF + β · smob2 + (1− α− β) · sres (1)
where α + β ≤ 1 are the weights assigned to VGGFace and MobileNetV2, respectively. Those
weights are optimised over the validation set in order to minimise the detection error rates.
3 Experimental Setup
3.1 Database
The database2 considered in the experimental evaluation was acquired within the BATL re-
search project [1], funded by the IARPA Odin program [22]. In collaboration with our project
partners at USC, data from 562 subjects were collected in two different stages, and comprise
both bona fide and PA samples. From each subject, five to six fingers were captured. It is
important to highlight that people from different gender, ethnicity, and age were considered
during the acquisition in order to model realistic conditions. In total, the database comprises
4,290 and 443 bona fide and PA samples.
For the PA samples, the selection of the PAI fabrication materials was based on the re-
quirements of Odin program evaluation, covering the most challenging PAIs [29, 20]. There are
a total of 35 different PAI species, which can be further categorised into eight main groups,
namely: dragon skin, latex, overlay, playdoh, printed fingers, silicone, silly putty, and wax. It
should be noted that all the materials used can be acquired in online shops, and the PAIs can
be fabricated by non-experts in the area. This is why they pose a severe threat to biometric
systems.
To carry out a fair evaluation, the database is split into non-overlapping training, validation,
and test datasets, as summarised in Table 1. For the development of our proposed fingerprint
PAD methods, both training and validation datasets are used in order to train the weights of
the systems and select the optimal network architectures. It is important to highlight that
we consider the same number of samples per class during the development of the systems in
order to avoid bias towards one class. For the final evaluation, the test dataset comprises the
remaining bona fide (4071) and PA (222) samples. Furthermore, the test dataset includes 5
2The project sponsor has indicated that they will make the SWIR finger database available in the near
future such that research results presented in this article can be reproduced.
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Table 1: Partition of training, validation and test datasets.
# Samples # PA Samples # BF Samples
Training set 260 130 130
Validation set 180 90 90
Test set 4293 222 4071
unknown PAI species, which were not considered during the development stage (i.e., they are
not present either in the train or in the validation datasets). This way, we can also evaluate
the robustness of our proposed methods to unknown attacks, thereby modelling realistic and
more challenging scenarios.
3.2 Metrics
The performance of the PAD method is evaluated in compliance with the ISO/IEC IS 30107-3
on Biometric presentation attack detection - Part 3: Testing and Reporting [15]. To that end,
the following metrics are used:
• Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): percentage of attack presenta-
tions wrongly classified as bona fide presentations.
• Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): percentage of bona fide pre-
sentations wrongly classified as presentation attacks.
The operating point at which APCER = BPCER is denoted as Detection Equal Error Rate
(D-EER). In addition to the D-EER, the APCER at BPCER = 0.2% (denoted as APCER0.2%)
will be also reported to evaluate systems with a high user convenience.
3.3 Experimental Protocol
Two different sets of experiments are carried out:
• Input pre-processing optimisation: first, the optimal filter size P (see Sect. 2.2.1 and
Fig. 2) needs to be determined for each model, in order to obtain the best detection
performance. This is done individually for each CNN model described in Sect. 2.2.2.
• Final fused system: after determining the optimal filter size and the APCEs of each CNN
model, the best fusion is carried out. In addition, the results are benchmarked with the
state of the art reported in [8, 33].
4 Results
4.1 Input Pre-Processing Optimisation
We first analyse the detection performance obtained over the test set for different filter sizes
P for each CNN model individually. The corresponding DET curves are presented in Fig. 5.
It should be noted that, whereas ResNet and both VGG models are fed a ROI image resized
to 58×58 px, both MobileNets receive 128×128 px. images as proposed in [33]. Therefore, the
filter sizes analysed for the former are smaller than for the latter.
As we may observe in Fig. 5a, ResNet achieves the lowest D-EER (0.45%) for a filter of size
11 (solid green). Even though this configuration presents a detection performance comparable
9
Multi-Spectral CNNs for Biometric Presentation Attack Detection M. Gomez-Barrero and C. Busch
to its RGB version (dashed dark blue) for a BPCER ≥ 0.5 (or APCER ≤ 0.5%), the most
relevant operation points for PAD purposes are those with a lower BPCER (e.g., BPCER =
0.2%). These yield a higher user convenience, which is for instance prioritized in the Odin
Program [22], thereby achieving a higher user acceptance. For these lower BPCER values,
P = 11 achieves the best detection performance, with an APCER0.2% = 1.80%. In contrast,
the RGB model reported an APCER0.2% = 6.79%, thereby having achieved a 73% relative
improvement with the new input pre-processing module in the CNN. On the other hand, for
an APCER ≤ 0.5% (i.e., very high security operating point), the best configuration is achieved
by the next filter size tested, with P = 13. Taking all these considerations into account, the
best performing filter size for low BPCERs, P = 11, is considered for further experiments.
A similar behaviour to ResNet is observed in Fig. 5b for MobileNet and P = 13 (solid green),
where the D-EER is reduced from 1.80% to 0.90%, and the APCER0.2% from 19.91% to 4.96%
(i.e., 75% relative improvement).
Regarding MobileNetV2, Fig. 5c shows a somewhat different trend. Except for P = 9, all
DET curves are close to each other. The main differences are observed for either low APCERs
or low BPCERs. In particular, for low BPCERs all filter sizes P 6= 17 present horizontal
asymptotes. In other words, the corresponding networks always classify a subset of bona fide
samples as attacks and are thus unable to reach a BPCER = 0%. In addition, P = 17 (solid
green, APCER0.2% = 4.96%) also shows the lowest BPCER for APCER ≤ 0.5%, thus making
it the best configuration for this model.
For VGG19, two different RGB networks are analysed in Fig. 5d. First, Tolosana et al.
[33] (dashed blue line) proposed re-training the last four layers of the network. However, with
the addition of the pre-processing input layer, and the reduced amount of data available for
adapting the network, convergence was not achieved. Therefore, we decided to adapt only the
last three layers, as shown in Fig. 3. The corresponding DET curve is depicted in dashed orange.
As a consequence, the D-EER increased from 1.36% to 1.80%. However, when all four images
are fed to the multi-spectral network, we observe that the performance is improved both for P
= 7 and 9. In particular, for lower BPCERs, we see that P = 7 (purple) manages to correct
the main drawback of VGG19: it is able to achieve a BPCER = 0% instead of presenting an
horizontal asymptote at BPCER around 1%. Therefore, the performance of the original RGB
CNN is considerable outperformed by the MS CNN for P = 7, which also achieves a APCER0.2%
= 3.60%.
Finally, the performance of the VGGFace based model is shown in Fig. 5e. In this case, we
observe again a similar behaviour to VGG19, with horizontal asymptotes, which is reasonable
since VGGFace is based on the very similar VGG16 model. However, in this case the asymptotes
are shown for all APCER values instead only for APCER ≥ 0.5%. This is due to the nature
of the database on which VGGFace was pre-trained: it contains only facial images. Therefore,
the first layers of the network, which are not adapted for the PAD problem at hand, extract
relevant information based on human skin and hair, relevant to face recognition, but have not
seen other materials for the fabrication of PAIs. This leads to a poorer performance on average
with respect to the other models, since a low BPCER of e.g. 0.2% cannot be achieved. On the
other hand, for low APCER values, the BPCER remains at 0.90% for P = 7, thereby showing
in this case the best performance for this limited range. As it will be shown in Sect. 4.2, this
will be relevant for a fused approach.
To conclude this subsection, we analyse the output of the pre-processing layers: is it really
different for each CNN model? In other words, is each model learning different information from
the very beginning? The answer is yes, as it may be observed for a bona fide sample in Fig. 6a
for the best filter sizes found before. In particular, both MobileNet and MobileNetV2 learn
10
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Figure 5: DET curves for each individual CNN model and different filter sizes P .
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Figure 6: Bona fide and presentation attack samples after the pre-processing of each CNN
model for the best configuration found.
representations with information distributed across the whole image, with different weights per
channel, similarly to the manual pre-processing carried out by [33]. However, the remaining
models focus on particular regions of the image and present a bigger black area “empty” of
information.
In addition, different PAI species are depicted in Fig. 6b for each model. For the “empty”
representations of ResNet, VGG19, and VGGFace for the bona fide samples, we can see that
the PAIs contain in contrast more information, and the CNNs can therefore discriminate bona
fides from PAs. In contrast, for MobileNet and MobileNetV2, the difference between bona fides
and PAs lies on the texture or the colour of the image.
Finally, it should be highlighted that all unknown attacks included in the test dataset were
correctly detected by all the individual CNN models.
4.2 Final Fused System
In the second and final set of experiments, we tried different fusions of two and three CNN
models in order to optimise the overall detection performance. To select which models would
be fused, the APCEs were analysed in detail, such that complementary models (i.e., making
different errors) would be fused. The best configuration was the fusion of ResNet with a filter
size of 11 (i.e., the best individual model) with MobileNetV2 with a filter size of 17, and
VGGFace with a filter size of 7. Using different filter sizes for each network also implies that
each model is focusing at different resolutions, thereby extracting different information. The
score level fusion for all possible α and β values (see Sect. 2.3) was analysed in terms of the
APCER0.2%, and the best results (i.e., ACPER0.2% = 1.35%) are presented in Fig. 7a. As it
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Figure 7: DET curves for (a) the best multi-spectral SWIR fusion, and (b) the fusion of the
former MS SWIR with the LSCI approach proposed in [17], benchmarked with the results
reported in [33] (RGB SWIR) and [8] (RGB Fusion).
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Figure 8: Fused PAD score distributions: (a) both PA and bona fide scores for all samples, and
(b) zoom of the bona fide PAD scores > 0.001.
may be observed, in all cases a remarkable D-EER = 0.45% is achieved.
Even if the detection performance obtained might be considered very good, we still can see
that the BPCER remains constant for all APCER values under 0.5%. Let us thus analyse the
PAD scores in Fig. 8 in detail. As we can see in Fig. 8a, all but one PA scores are close to one,
in particular over δ = 0.9937. However, there is a single PAD score of 0.5933 (one conductive
silicone overlay out of the 60 included in the test set). On the other hand, the distribution
of the bona fide scores is wider, and comprises scores in the whole range. In particular, 3026
PAD scores out of the 4071 are lower than 0.0001 for the bona fides. The distribution of the
remaining 1045 scores (i.e., 25.65% of the total number of scores) is shown in Fig. 8b.
Taking into account the analysis of the scores, we set the PAD decision threshold at δ =
0.9937. In this case, only 13 bona fide samples are misclassified; i.e., a BPCER = 0.32% is
obtained. The corresponding BPCE SWIR samples at 1200 nm are shown in Fig. 9. Carefully
analysing those images, we can observe that the high scores are mostly motivated by missposi-
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Figure 9: SWIR images captured 1200 nm for the bona fides yielding the highest PAD scores.
tioning the finger on the slot, so that the ROI still includes black areas. In addition, one sample
is badly focused and shows no texture, and the base of the finger is badly illuminated on the
last images, most probably due to a non-horizontal position of the finger. That way, the base
of the finger is under illuminated.
Finally, we focus on the fusion with α = 0.4 and β = 0.1. Even if the performance is similar
to the approach with α = 0.7 and β = 0.0, including information from three instead of two
models will make the approach more robust to yet unforeseen attacks. In Fig. 7b, we benchmark
this approach (solid yellow) with the best RGB SWIR fusion in [33] (dashed green), and with the
RGB SWIR and laser speckle contrast imaging (LSCI) fusion described in [8] (dashed orange).
For completeness, we also show the individual LSCI results from [8, 17] (dashed purple). As
it may be observed, the fused multi-spectral SWIR approach (solid blue) already outperforms
the state of the art approaches presented in [33, 8]. This improvement also holds for BPCER ≤
0.5% even in the case of fusing the RGB SWIR CNNs with LSCI data. Furthermore, if we also
fuse at score-level the multi-spectral SWIR CNNs with the same LSCI approach (solid yellow),
we can further reduce the D-EER to 0.2%, and the ACPER0.2% is as low as 0.90% (i.e., only
two PA samples are not detected).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed the use of multi-spectral CNN models with four input channels
in combination with SWIR images for fingerprint PAD purposes. In contrast to the manual
pre-processing method proposed in [33] to extract RGB images from the four grayscale SWIR
samples, in our work we add a convolutional layer at the beginning of the CNN models with
four channels as input and three channels as output. This additional layer is trained together
with the full network or its last layers in the case of transfer learning approaches.
We thoroughly studied different filter sizes for the new pre-processing layer, and took into
account five different and state of the art CNN models, both trained from scratch and previously
trained on bigger databases acquired in the visible spectrum. The results, evaluated on a
database comprising more than 4700 samples and 35 different PAI species, indicate a clear
improvement with respect to the method proposed in [33]. For the best fusion configuration
found in each work, the D-EER decreased from 1.35% to 0.45% (relative decrease of 66%).
In addition, a score-level fusion of the SWIR method with handcrafted features extracted
from LSCI data following the example in [8] yields a very secure and very convenient PAD
module. In more details, only two PA samples out of 222, stemming from 35 different PAI
species, are misclassified for a high user convenience operating point with a BPCER = 0.2%
(i.e., only 2 in 1,000 bona fide attempts are rejected).
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